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JUST JUSTICE: A REPLY TO MR. McCONNELL
D.

NOLAN KAISER

When institutional practices are subjected to criticism from the
perspective of a different tradition there is a tendency for practitioners
to invoke in its defense highly visible principles and technical expertise
integral to the institutional practice. Law is no exception. Footnotes
may document the technical basis of the legal practice in question, but
it is not its legal existence, it is its moral coherence which is called into
question. Again, little progress can be had when we are invited to
choose between conventional beliefs exhibiting blindness about blindness, and a basic constitutional right.
I will indicate five areas where Mr. McConnell's arguments fail
and provide reasons for some of these failures. I will close with a position statement that places the controversy in moral and legal
perspective.
ENSHRINING A MISCONCEPTION

"No man can see with another's eye, no more can a man conclude

with another's understanding or reasoning." It is true that I do not see
with your eye, nor reason to conclusion with your faculty of reasoning.
It is false to say that I cannot understand and accredit what you report
having seen. This does not mean that I cannot understand what you
report understanding, nor that I cannot reason to conclusion on premises supplied by your reasoning. In the first sense these words are true
but trivial, and no one would think it important to dispute them. In the
second sense they are false, though their failure is informative. Vaughn
and McConnell have confused the true statement: "One who cannot
see does not know by seeing" with: "One who does not see what others
know by seeing does not know that thing." A misconception is not
given greater believability because it is articulated by a chief justice.
The presumption that it does colors nearly everything that follows in
Mr. McConnell's review.
ALLEGATION OF CONFUSION CONFIRMS IT

McConnell draws the distinction between the litigant's right to
trial by jury and the mythic right of individuals to sit on a jury. He
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says that I have confused these two rights, only one of which is recognized at law, and he pushes this theme in variation. True, I complain
about legal practice which systematically denies blind persons an opportunity to serve as jurors and he reminds me: "It is only the litigants,
not prospective jurors, who may complain about the exclusion of a particular person or class of persons from jury service." He confuses my
prescriptive statements about the law for a descriptive statement of the
law. I do not force blind jurors on litigants who would not have them.
The belief that I do misses my position and so the program of my
paper.
THE LOGIC OF THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

In Michigan as in other state jurisdictions, when the law summons
blind persons as prospective jurors, the law recognizes them as prima
facie qualified for jury duty. It remains for examination in voir dire to
determine actual qualifications for the particular case being litigated.
Because the logical corollary of a litigant's right to challenge is the right
not to challenge, litigants have the right to claim those jurors they have
not challenged. It follows that a full statement of the esteemed right to
jury trial can encompass jury duty for blind persons.
RETENTION AND DELIBERATION

From the fact that persons accustomed to both seeing and hearing
do not retain as much of the information as they normally would when
one of the avenues of perceptual information is blocked only tells us
about the fall-off in retention rates among normal persons who have
been experimentally handicapped. It tells us nothing valid about retention rates among blind or deaf persons who are accustomed to their
handicapped manner of information gathering.
In deliberation, jurors provide evidence missed or forgotten;
through argument they increase or decrease the weight that a particular
piece of evidence commands; they draw parallels and interconnections
and so persuade or dissuade each other at various points and on various issues. This milieu of information exchange conjoined with access
to exhibits and needed parts of the trial transcript makes available all
the competent evidence upon which independent judgment and just
verdict must rest. In this information-rich environment it is as reasonable to believe that a blind person can acquit his juror duties as it is
that a blind person can acquit his judicial duties. Perceptual limitation
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must not be confused with absolute data deprivation or conceptual
incompetence.
THE BLIND JUDGE ARGUMENT MISCONSTRUED

Some, like Emerson, may think that enslavement to consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds, but lawyers and logicians know better. If
the judge be blind and assigned to the case and the litigants waive their
right to trial by jury, is there any coherent doubt remaining that the law
accepts blind triers of fact? Since the judge's knowledge of law presumptively is of no effect in his "reasoning to finding" on the facts,
consistency demands the legal possibility of blind lay jurors.
Between the legal duty to serve in the armed forces during national emergency and the legal duty to pay a tax liability, there is the
intermediate area of jury duty over which there is geniune controversy.
In many states, legislators have attempted to resolve the controversy by
statutory enactment. In other jurisdictions jury commissioners or similar court officials have modified rules which previously excluded blind
or deaf persons from jury duty. Many legislators and a growing
number of court officials, including judges, share my view that absent
convincing arguments by litigants in voir dire, blind and other perceptually handicapped persons may be seated on juries. Such jurors do
not pose a generic threat to a litigant's constitutional right to swift and
public trial by an impartial jury. If any litigant continues to think so in
a particular case, his right to peremptory challenge remains to defend
both his belief and his interest. Amending legal practice in the way I
suggest breaks down one more barrier to a full and active civic role for
such persons. It is a desirable policy goal, but even more, it is the
recognition of a perceptually handicapped person's right to equal consideration in the society. In honoring this principle we satisfy one of
the requirements of social justice.

